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Abstract 
This study is based on a fusion of the frameworks proposed by Von Krogh and Grand 
(2000) and Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), that can potentially offer insight on the 
impact of the dominant logic of the firm on the organizational knowledge acquisition 
and consequently on its knowledge creation ability. 
This study has attempted to test this framework by looking at Hong Kong's 
manufacturing industry, which followed a different path of restructuring by 
relocation, instead of upgrading as followed by other NIEs. 
The findings from this study suggests that: 
Firstly, the framework may be able to provide a ftirther explanation for this path 
taken: the dominant logic that prevailed in the industry focused on the acquisition 
of explicit knowledge, whilst tacit knowledge appears to have been hampered in 
some ways, resulting in a lack of capability for knowledge creation. In turn, this 
deficiency appears to have forced the firms to take to an alternative strategy. 
Secondly, the framework has some predictive ability on the likelihood of 
companies to be successful in a knowledge-based economy, although further 
studies - such as a study of firms who did not follow the relocation strategy - may 
help to strengthen it. 
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1. Introduction 
Moving to a "knowledge-based economy" is not easy - many researchers and writers 
have difficulty even in defining the term. Nevertheless, the idea of knowledge being a 
source of competitive advantage of firms appears to be the common consensus. Many 
countries - the industrialized, the newly industrialized as well as the developing 
countries — are eager to seek this new source of competitive advantage and have 
begun to encourage their people and their businesses to shift attention to this idea. In a 
knowledge-based global economy, as more and more firms begin to shift the basis of 
competition to knowledge, another consensus appears to be that the ability to create 
knowledge is a key capability. 
Hong Kong too has embarked on a shift to the new knowledge-based economy - a 
move announced by Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, following 
the return of Hong Kong to its motherland, the People's Republic of China. However, 
many have cast doubts whether the territory — long famous for its entrepreneurial 
ability based not on innovation, but rather copying from others — would have what it 
takes to make it as a knowledge-based economy. 
This study offers to shed some light on the question: "Why have Hong Kong 
businesses tended to lack innovation - the ability for knowledge creation — and have 
tended to follow the "copying" model?" 
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In order to do so, this study uses a few theoretical ideas that have emerged from the 
field of Organizational Knowledge and Learning (1), and apply them to the 
manufacturing industry in Hong Kong. 
The first idea is that tacit knowledge is important if not more important than explicit 
knowledge in the process of knowledge creation. Hence, according to the proponents 
of this framework: "organizational knowledge creation is a continuous and dynamic 
interaction between tacit and explicit knowledge.... The sharing of tacit knowledge 
among multiple individuals with different backgrounds, perspectives, and motivations 
becomes the critical step for organizational knowledge creation to take place" 
(Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995)). 
The second idea is that the dominant general management logic of an organization is 
essentially the gatekeeper of knowledge creation within the organization i.e. 
"justification processes decide whether new knowledge is rejected, returned for 
further elaboration, or appropriated as justified true belief by the corporation" (Von 
Krogh and Grand (2000)). 
Weaving the two ideas together, we can begin to define research questions in more 
detail, for example: What is the nature of the dominant logic in Hong Kong firms? 
What kind of new knowledge is allowed to be appropriated as organizational 
knowledge by the dominant logic of Hong Kong firms? How would the knowledge 
appropriated and as well as those rejected consequently affect the knowledge creation 
ability of Hong Kong firms? 
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In this study, a pilot attempt is made to ask the above questions by focusing only on 
firms in the manufacturing industry. The purpose is to find out whether the questions 
may yield meaningful insights for further theorizing. Many researchers agree that the 
manufacturing industry in Hong Kong had one critical difference from the other East 
Asian newly industrialized economies (NIEs) - its distinctive path of industrial 
restructuring since the 1980s by relocation rather than upgrading or investing in R&D. 
This clearly suggests that there is a set of unique dominant logic operating in this 
industry. If the dominant logic of these firms can be understood i.e. in the way they 
impact on the kinds of new knowledge that is allowed or excluded, we can then use 
them as basis to study the wider population of business organizations in Hong Kong. 
Since this dominant logic appears to have operated for most of the firms in the 
industry — most firms followed the relocation path - this indicates a historical 
overview of the industry, instead of a firm level review, may be the most efficient and 
comprehensive way to deduce the nature of the dominant logic. This historical 
overview is carried out based on the various works of other researchers. 
It is hoped that by understanding the nature of the dominant logic and how they 
operate to affect knowledge creation in the Hong Kong context may help policy 
makers and businesses better address the fundamental challenges in shifting to, and 
competing in a "knowledge-based economy". 
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LI Defining a ^^Knowledge-based Economy" 
Moving to a "knowledge-based economy" is not easy, as many researchers and 
writers have difficulty in defining the term, let alone making progress at it. Stanford 
Professor of Economics and History, Paul A. David, noted in a recent presentation at 
the OECD Knowledge Management Seminar, (David, 2002): 
"A variety of terms related to "the knowledge based economy" (KBE) came 
into circulation in business, government and academic publications during the 
1990’s, many of them deriving from perceptions that the landscape of 
economic activities was being transformed by advances in information 
technologies culminating in the deployment of computer-mediated electronic 
communications networks, most noticeable in the Internet 's explosive growth. 
Much promotional enthusiasm connected with developments in the ICT-
producing branches of the economy surrounded the rise of academic and 
governmental interest in grasping the nature and future of the "information 
society" (Mansell and Steinmueller, 2000). Indeed, during the latter part of the 
1990s this fixation upon electronic information-equipment and information-
goods was reflected in the proliferation of economists' efforts to brand the 
putatively newest epoch of development — alternatively, as "the e-economy" 
(Cohen and Zyman), the "digital economy" (Bryjnolfsson and Kahin), the 
"weight-less economy" (Quah), "intellectual capitalism" (Grandstrand) or, 
more cautiously, just "the Next Economy" (DeLong). The aura of "hype" that 
accompanied this outburst of creative labeling now has evaporated, another 
casualty of the ending of the long bull market in stocks, and the sudden 
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collapse of the "dot-com" bubble." What has remained largely intact, however, 
is the longer-standing set of shared perceptions about the existence and 
character of transformations in the structure of economic life." (Italics added.) 
Elsewhere, he adds (in, David and Foray, 2002): 
"Knowledge has been at the heart of economic growth and the gradual rise in 
levels of social well-being since time immemorial. The ability to invent and 
innovate, that is to create new knowledge and new ideas that are then embodied 
in products, processes and organizations, has always served to fuel development. 
And there have always been organizations and institutions capable of creating 
and disseminating knowledge: from the medieval guilds through to the large 
business corporations of the early twentieth century, from the Cistercian abbeys 
to the royal academies of science that began to emerge in the seventeenth 
century. "Knowledge-based economy", however, is a recently coined term. As 
such, its use is meant to signify a change form the economies of earlier periods, 
more a "sea-change" than a sharp discontinuity. This transformation can be 
analyzed at a number of different levels" - which he categorizes into: 
• The acceleration of knowledge production; 
• The rise of intangible capital at macroecoiiomic level; 
• Innovation is becoming the dominant activity, its sources ever-more 
varied; and 
• The revolution in instruments of knowledge. 
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Perhaps Peter Drucker, the famed management guru, put it most succinctly when he 
wrote about the "knowledge society" in his 1993 book 'Post-Capitalist Society': 
"The industries that have moved into the center of the economy in the last 
forty years have as their business the production and distribution of knowledge 
and information, rather than production and distribution of things.... We are 
entering the "knowledge society" in which the basic economic resource is no 
longer capital or natural resources, or labor, but is and will be knowledge and 
where knowledge workers will play a central role." 
Despite the difficulty in defining the “knowledge-based economy", the idea of 
knowledge being a source of competitive advantage of firms appears to be the 
common consensus. Many countries - the industrialized (e.g. USA, Great Britain, 
Germany), the newly industrialized (Singapore, Malaysia) as well as the developing 
countries - are all eager to seek this new source of competitive advantage - have 
begun to encourage their people and their businesses to shift attention to this idea. In a 
knowledge-based global economy, as firms begin to shift the basis to knowledge, 
another consensus appears to be that then ability to create knowledge is a key 
capability. In addition, the notion of a knowledge-based economy is also putting 
greater attention on the knowledge worker, because knowledge resides in the 
individual and is created in their social interaction with customers, suppliers and co-
workers. 
Hong Kong too has embarked on a shift to the new knowledge-based economy. This 
was a move announced by Hong Kong's Chief Executive, Mr. Tung Chee Hwa, 
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following the return of Hong Kong to its motherland, the People's Republic of China. 
This announcement and others that followed has been seen as something of a 
breakaway from the positive non-intervention policy of the British colonial 
government. Recently, owing to China's membership of the World Trade 
Organization, as well the decline in cost of doing business elsewhere in Asia, question 
marks have been raised over Hong Kong's position as gateway to China and also its 
long term competitiveness. The call for a shift towards a knowledge-based economy 
seems timely indeed for Hong Kong. However, many local as well as foreign 
businessmen have cast doubts whether the territory 一 long famous for its 
entrepreneurial ability based not on its own innovations, but rather on the ability of its 
many businesses to copy from others - would have what it takes to make it as a 
knowledge-based economy. Some even report that, R&D in Hong Kong stands for 
"replication and duplication", not "research and development" (McKinsey 2001). 
Nevertheless, given the direction taken by other countries and also Hong Kong's own 
problems, the most important question is probably not whether Hong Kong should be 
a knowledge-based economy, but rather how can it become one. Hence, to begin 
with, an understanding of how knowledge creation comes about is necessary. 
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1.2 The Theory of Knowledge Creation 
Along with the growing interest in the knowledge-based economy, which as 
mentioned earlier coincided with the internet boom, many businesses have begun to 
take steps to position themselves as knowledge organizations. Hence, it is not 
surprising that vendors of information technology are pushing the latest knowledge 
management software, whilst knowledge management has become another major 
selling program for management consultant. 
Most academic researchers however warn against the hype - noting that knowledge 
cannot be equated with information. However, the contribution from scholars 
themselves is varied, reflecting multidisciplinary approaches that draw upon the 
theoretical insights from diverse management disciplines ranging from management 
information systems, operations management, organizational behavior and strategic 
management. One writer notes that at least five major strands of literature on 
knowledge creation management can be discerned, although there has been something 
of a consensus that much of the organizational challenge with regards to managing 
knowledge has to do with tacit knowledge rather than explicit knowledge (Wong 
2000). With tacit knowledge as its central theme, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
developed the theory of knowledge creation. According to the two writers: "human 
knowledge is created and expanded through social interaction between tacit 
knowledge and explicit knowledge". However, as businesses are concerned with the 
management of organizational knowledge rather than individual knowledge, they 
argue that: 
8 
• The organization cannot create knowledge on its own without the initiative of 
the individual and the interaction that takes place within the group. 
• The sharing of tacit knowledge among multiple individuals with different 
backgrounds, perspectives, and motivations becomes the critical step for 
organizational knowledge creation to take place. 
• Organizational knowledge creation is a continuous and dynamic interaction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge. 
• The role of the organization in the organizational knowledge-creation process 
is to provide the proper context for facilitating group activities as well as the 
creation and accumulation of knowledge at the individual level. 
The theory of knowledge creation was further elaborated in von Krogh, Ichijo and 
Nonaka (2000), stressing the importance of care and mindfulness within the corporate 
context: 
• The fragility of knowledge creation means that it must be carefully supported 
by a number of activities that enable it to happen in spite of the obstacles. 
• The concept of care matters most in an organization when those in charge 
provide a context in which knowledge is created and shared freely. 
• The whole process of knowledge creation depends on sensitive and aware 
managers who encourage a social setting in which knowledge continues to 
grow. 
They warn that in the absence of such an environment, "individuals often decide to 
stop contributing new ideas". With regards to the various knowledge management 
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practices, they note that: "knowledge management as it is practiced in most firms 
represents a constricting paradigm rather than a transformative one." 
Therefore, from an organizational context, it can be argued that new organizational 
knowledge can only be said to have been created when individual knowledge 
becomes diffused, adopted and embedded as new codes and routines that guide the 
actions of a significant number of organizational members (Argyris and Schon 1996). 
The question remains though as to how individual knowledge becomes accepted as 
organizational knowledge. Von Krogh and Grand (2000) offer the idea that the 
dominant general management logic of an organization is essentially the gatekeeper 
on knowledge creation within the organization i.e. "justification processes decide 
whether new knowledge is rejected, returned for further elaboration, or appropriated 
as justified true belief by the corporation". 
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1.3 Dominant General Management Logic 
-Organizational Knowledge Gatekeeper 
Prahalad and Bettis (1986) introduced the concept "dominant general management 
logic" in arguing that strategic decisions depended on the cognitive orientation of the 
decision makers. 
In attempting to complete the understanding of the theory of knowledge creation, 
Georg von Krogh and Simon Grand (2000) agree with Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) 
in that corporate knowledge can be referred to as justified true belief. As mentioned 
above, they further adopted the concept "dominant logic" in their attempt to shed light 
on the processes of justification, which illustrate how knowledge becomes relevant for 
a broader range of people. Their basic argument (which is depicted in Appendix 1) is 
quoted at length as follows: 
Justification processes decide whether new knowledge is rejected, returned for 
further elaboration or rather appropriated as justified true belief by the 
corporation. Justification processes are essentially influenced by the dominant 
general management logic, which consists of: 
The Organization ^s Corpus of Knowledge At any point in time, one can 
determine (more or less clearly) some dominant strategic orientation. It 
integrates the currently accepted, reproduced and shared ideas of existing 
solutions, open problems, relevant frames and implicit theories which 
structure and dominate arguments and discussions, representing the basic 
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understanding of all important organizational issues. This corresponds with 
what we understand by paradigms (Kuhn, 1962), including the explicit 
contents of what is known by a corporation and can be partially explained by 
the people involved. In the corporate context, this corpus of knowledge 
includes: 
• The delineation of business boundaries (what is our business about?); 
• The pre-dominant business model (how will we develop? how do we 
create returns?); 
• Implicit theories about the key success factors in the business 
(technological progress, product innovation, procedural efficiency?); 
• referential success stories which serve as benchmarks (reference firms? 
why are they successful?). 
Together, these different arguments, implicit models and underlying narratives 
form the patterns and arguments dominating most managerial speaking and 
acting. 
The Organization ’s Images of Knowledge The corpus of related relevant 
knowledge is related to the images of knowledge that specify the appropriate 
argumentative patterns which rationalize, justify and legitimize theoretical 
contributions and strategic initiatives. Images of knowledge range from logical 
deduction ("it is reasonable to do it like this") to explanations in terms of 
tradition ("we have always done it like that"), authority ("top management or 
the specialists decide"), analogies ("it is just like that case we had ...，'）as well 
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as novelty ("we really should try something new"). In the corporate context, 
these images of knowledge include processes and arguments that are accepted 
as demonstrating the soundness and cogency of an argument, i.e.: 
• Do managers have to explain their strategies in terms of financial return, or 
rather of technological trends? 
• Are the customers key, or does the strategy focus on the shareholders? 
• Should discussions dwell upon past success, or upon future returns? 
The Organization ^s Ideological Values Finally, these different knowledge 
dimensions are evaluated on the basis of the overall values of the company. 
They express the value system of the organization and its social and 
institutional context, determining the basic business philosophy as well as the 
vision of the organization. With respect to the images of knowledge, the 
ideological values will decide to what extent arguments and managerial 
discourses are relevant at all, and what the basic reference points of the 
organization should be (success, vision, or rather ethics and culture). 
In line with proposition by Von Krogh and Grand (2000) to combine the concept of 
dominant logic with the theory of knowledge creation, the combined framework can 
potentially offer interesting insight on the impact of the dominant logic of the firm on 
the organizational knowledge acquisition and consequently on its knowledge creation 
ability. As mentioned in the introduction, this study will apply the framework on 
Hong Kong's manufacturing industry. 
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2. The Study - Hong Kong's Manufacturing Industry and the Evolvement of 
the Dominant Logic 
In this section, an historical overview of Hong Kong's manufacturing industry is 
carried out - based on the various works of other researchers - to deduce the nature of 
the dominant logic that appeared to have operated in most of the firms in the industry, 
especially as seen in its restructuring. 
Chiu And Wong (2000) who studied the restructuring the manufacturing industry, 
noted "its distinctive path of industrial restructuring (since the 1980s) by relocation 
rather than upgrading". They note in reviewing the previous studies: 
UNCTAD (1996) compares the four NIEs on their export patterns over the 
three decades from 1963 to 1990, only to find Hong Kong to be losing its 
market share in almost half of the highly dynamic products in which it had 
earlier built a strong market presence. Chow and Kellman (1993) also offer a 
similar assessment: while all the four NIEs have successfully upgraded their 
exports from labor-intensive and resource-base products to more technology-
intensive ones, Hong Kong nonetheless have the least structural 
transformation of commodity composition of exports over the period from 
mid-60s to early 90s. With the other three NIEs having dramatically 
transformed their industrial bases in one way or another (Chiu 1994; Ernst and 
O'Conner 1992; Hobday 1995; Mody 1990)，it is puzzling that Hong Kong 
have got stuck to labor-intensive manufacturing for three decades (Chiu, Ho 
and Lui 1997). 
14 
Indeed, as the following historical overview(2) shows, various events and the 
influence of both the British colonial government and its immigrant population, have 
lent a distinct quality to Hong Kong, as well as the industry. 
2.1 Historical Events 
Following the end of the first Opium War in 1841, the Treaty of Nanking ceded the 
territory to the British in perpetuity. Following additional conflicts with the Chinese 
in 1860 Britain gained Kowloon and Stonecutters Island. In 1898, the British also 
gained a 99-year lease on the New Territories, which they felt essential to protect their 
interests on Hong Kong Island. Hence, Hong Kong became a colony and trading port 
(entrepot) for the British Empire. 
Prior to WWII, Hong Kong began a gradual shift away from trade to manufacturing. 
This move was hastened by the civil war in China during the 1920s and by the 
Japanese invasion in the 1930s, when Chinese capitalists fled to the safer confines of 
the colony. 
In 1937, the Sino-Japanese war broke out after Japan seized Manchuria in 1932. 
Throughout the late thirties, as Japan advanced into China, hundreds of thousands of 
Chinese took refuge in Hong Kong. It was estimated that some 100,000 refugees 
entered in 1937, 500,000 in 1938 and 150,000 in 1939 - bringing Hong Kong's 
population at the outbreak of World War II to an estimated 1.6 million. At the height 
of the influx, about 500,000 people were estimated sleeping in the streets. In 1941, as 
World War II broke out Japanese aircraft bombed Kowloon and Japanese troops 
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forced the British to surrender Hong Kong and the social and economic life of Hong 
Kong was disrupted. Japan's surrender in 1945, saw Britain reclaiming the territory 
and Hong Kong was once again a major trading center. In 1949，when the Nationalist-
Communist Civil War in China was won by the Communists, hundreds of thousands 
of people again fled to Hong Kong. 
In 1950, the US imposed of an embargo on all the goods of Chinese origin and the 
United Nations' prohibition of the export of essential materials and strategic goods to 
China to penalize China for its support of North Korea during the Korean War. As a 
result. Hong Kong lost virtually all of its entrepot trade with China. The US embargo 
would last 21 years, to be lifted only in 1971 prior to President Nixon's visit to China. 
Following the US embargo on China, it was forced to begin industrial diversification. 
The late 1950，s saw the increase in activity in light manufacturing such as plastics 
products, clothing and textiles electronics manufacturing, and ancillary services such 
as banking and insurance begin to grow. The colony was able take advantage of the 
constant influx from China of capital and manpower. At the same as well, both 
Japanese firms and US corporations tried to enhance their competitiveness by 
relocating the labor-intensive processes to Hong Kong and other Asian countries for 
cost reduction. Electronics production in Hong Kong began with the subcontracting of 
radio assembly for Japan in 1959 and then extended to the other standardized 
products, parts and components. In the meantime, Hong Kong became the principal 
Asian assembler of semiconductors for the US market, with the establishment of 
subsidiaries by semiconductor producers. 
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Hong Kong's existence was threatened again during the Cultural Revolution in the 
1960s. Although the Chinese could have re-taken Hong Kong with ease, China was as 
reliant on Hong Kong as Hong Kong was on China. 
Since the mid-1970s, the electronics industry has been facing structural problems such 
as rising wage and land costs, a low level of technology, weak supporting parts and 
components segments, and an over-reliance on the US market and on Japanese supply 
of critical components. Owing to the fragility of Hong Kong's political status and the 
British policy of keeping city-state colonies as entrepot and free trade center, the 
government was unwilling to subsidize R&D and industrial upgrading, and 
maintained a highly unregulated, flexible labor market. The manufacturers' need for 
cost reduction in labor and land was accommodated by China's Open Door Policy. 
Since 1978, the Chinese authorities decided to attract foreign direct investment, 
expecting that overseas Chinese would be interested in investing in the Qiaoxiang 
areas (areas from which overseas Chinese and their ancestors emigrated) (HAS, 1997: 
29). Four special economic zones (SEZs) were established, and the first was Shenzhen 
SEZ. Shenzhen SEZ became a cheap labor haven for Hong Kong-based 
manufacturers, including Western and Japanese firms. Nevertheless, there were some 
differences in the aim, form and scale of investment between Japanese, US and Hong 
Kong firms. Japanese firms generally aimed at market penetration in the long run. 
They were willing to transfer technology in exchange for licenses to sell in the China 
market. US firms were more varied; some aimed also at market penetration whereas 
many others aimed simply at cheap labor and land supply like what Hong Kong firms 
did. Whereas the US and Japanese firms tended to establish longer-term contracts and 
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invest on a larger scale, Hong Kong firms took advantage of the processing or 
assembling arrangement on a very short term basis. 
Since the mid-1980s, the SEZ authorities started to put pressure on foreign investors 
to upgrade their investments from processing and assembling arrangements to joint 
ventures with Chinese partners or wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries (WFOs) when 
the foreign investors applied for a renewal of their investment contracts. To avoid the 
upgrading, many moved out of the SEZ to the Bao'an District of Shenzhen or further 
north to the other Pearl River Delta cities. Those who remained in Shenzhen had to 
comply with the new demands. During the same period, an increasing number of 
smaller US and Japanese firms have partnered with Hong Kong firms to establish 
joint ventures in SEZ (and in China as a whole). These smaller enterprises did not 
have the same political clout to get advantageous terms from the Chinese authorities 
as the brand name companies. Their Hong Kong partners could provide vital shortcuts 
around the often-laborious process of establishing connections in China (Goldstein, 
1988). The local manufacturing capability of Shenzhen was weak with 
underdeveloped basic industries and a shortage of both skilled and semi-skilled 
workforce. The expanding service sector attracted local young people away from 
blue-collar work. Thus, manufacturers resorted to employing low-skilled, migrant 
workers. The local authorities were lax in enforcing labor regulations. The inflow of 
migrant labor, however, strained the already inadequate infrastructure. Hence, the 
authorities increasingly imposed various items of social infrastructure fees on 
manufacturers. Manufacturers found it difficult to estimate the production expenses 
and tended to skirt laws and regulations and to cut wages and welfare in order to 
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prepare for the "rainy days". This, in turn, reinforced the high turnover of (migrant) 
workers, which was unfavorable to local skill formation. 
In 1984，Britain and China reached an agreement that Hong Kong would revert back 
to Chinese authority in 1997. With the impending China takeover of Hong Kong, the 
colonial government had no intent to steer the colony toward high-tech 
industrialization. Its approach was highly market-driven, encouraging the survival of 
the fittest. 
2.2 The Impact of the British Colonial Government 
Hong Kong's British colonial government's primary contribution to Hong Kong is the 
installation of legal codes and order. The Qing Dynasty did possess some legal codes, 
especially for criminal law. However, the British legal code emphasizes individual 
responsibility under the law as opposed to the traditional framework, the colonial 
government maintained a relatively laissez-faire attitude regarding its responsibility 
under the law as opposed to the traditional Chinese doctrine of mutual responsibility. 
Under this skeletal framework, the colonial government maintained a relatively 
laissez-faire attitude regarding its responsibility towards society. 
The colonial government regarded any economic investment other than trade as 
politically risky, given the political turbulence in China (the establishment of the 
Communist rule in 1949 and the Cultural revolution in the 1960s). Furthermore, it had 
never wanted to promote industrial development since it was beyond the imperial plan 
and the control of the trading and financial interests. 
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2.3 The Immigrant Population and Reliance on the Collective Family 
McEwen (1994) notes: 
Immigrants comprised the bulk of entrepreneurship until the last decade when 
the number of local-born entrepreneurs increased (Sit & Wong, 1989). The 
wave of industrialists in 1949 from Shanghai and other Chinese cities helped 
to establish the manufacturing base for the future of Hong Kong. Coupled 
with the labor force composed of immigrants from Guangdong, it set the stage 
for Hong Kong's industrialization. The post-1949 immigrants brought little or 
no financial assets - particularly those from Guangdong. They would become 
the essential small and medium entrepreneurs of Hong Kong. They relied on 
the collective efforts of the family to make ends meet, using personal or family 
savings to create capital (Donnithorne, 1983: 299). Furthermore, the 
immigrants from Guangdong lagged behind in their educational background 
compared to those in professional or administrative occupations, selecting 
small-scale industry as a career because of its relatively easy entry (Sit & 
Wong, 1989: 97). Many of these immigrant entrepreneurs came from a 
peasant or artisan background, and carried the cultural capital of little 
education and hard work with them to Hong Kong (Sit & Wong, 1989: 99). 
These factors helped to create the entrepreneurial familism by which scholars 
describe Hong Kong society (Wong, 1991:21). 
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The gulf between the government and society created the atmosphere, which 
allowed these cultural factors to take hold. Lau's thesis of a "minimally 
integrated socio-political framework" recognizes the British reluctance to 
interfere into the everyday life of the colony. This diffidence creates a dual 
scenario: a reliance on the family for social welfare, while creating space in 
which the Chinese could operate their business with little interference. 
Hong Kong has seen a proliferation of family businesses during the last forty 
years. This system of both small and large family firms has served as the 
backbone of Hong Kong's economy, functioning almost exclusively in the 
manufacturing sector until quite recently. This dependence on the family 
emanates from both historical and cultural reasons. The general social 
structure of imperial China emphasized the family as a landmark against 
economic adversity. 
Silin discovered that xinyong (trust) "was the crucial factor in upholding the 
complex network of trading relations" (Silin, 1972). Wong Siu-lun found that 
guanxi (relationships) were used in order to get business orders (Wong, 1991). 
Business relations in Hong Kong have been established on a bed of cultural 
values, which involve close relationships. 
In short we can see that socio-political volatility, lack of capital and lack of initial 
technology base and subsequent support from the government played important roles 
in the formation of the dominant logic of the firms in the industry. 
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3. Findings of the Study 
Based on the foregoing overview, the following is an attempt to describe the dominant 
logic of the firms in the industry along the components outlined earlier: 
3.1 The Manufacturing Firms, Ideological Values 
Owing to the lack of capital, the family network becomes an important source of 
capital for doing business as well as a source of business. The need for establishing 
trust becomes an important for the firms. 
Paradoxically perhaps, the importance placed on trust also points to the prevalence of 
distrust within society. Trust is valuable, since losing it 一 resulting in distrust — can 
lead to isolation from the family and business network and ultimately the ability to 
survive. Therefore, businesses that have managed to establish trust have great 
incentives not to cause the trust to be questioned. 
A person or party who introduce discontinuities, which by definition are interruptions 
to the established patterns, can potentially cause the trust in the person or party to be 
questioned. Hence, heuristically, new ideas (and person(s)) that do not conform to the 
established understanding or way of doing business are taken with great suspicion and 
viewed as "risky". 
This ideological value perhaps help to explain劣 why within the family and also the 
family business network, individuals and businesses alike are prone to follow the 
established ways and why they themselves are not willing to consider any actions that 
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can be perceived as great discontinuities, let alone introducing them into the family 
and the family business network. On the other hand, it also helps explain why 
incremental ideas are more readily accepted. 
3.2 The Manufacturing Firms, Corpus of Knowledge 
The manufacturing technology and labor skills that the businesses utilized from the 
beginning were not sophisticated. Because of this ease of entry, the critical challenge 
was to find buyers. 
Hong Kong itself could not offer a large domestic market. Instead the most attractive 
buyers were from overseas, typically from the US and Europe, especially because of 
their large orders that ensured coverage of the companies' overheads. The 
manufacturing industry, owing to the fact that they do not have neither access to 
technology and the importance of making a return on borrowed capital, were willing 
to compete on price and hoping to make up enough on volume sales to cover fixed 
costs - which given their small scale was not difficult to achieve if they succeeded in 
obtaining the orders. Consequently, the overseas buyers have better bargaining 
power. This buyer-led strategy led at least one study to note that firms have early on 
developed a heavy commercial orientation in their organization (Chiu and Wong 
2000). 
This focus on the buyers meant that over time, sales and marketing strategies became 
important, and market knowledge became the corpus of knowledge within their 
dominant logic. 
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3.3 The Manufacturing Firms, Images of Knowledge 
In the context of the manufacturing firms, the images of knowledge specify the 
argumentative patterns that rationalize and legitimize sales and marketing strategies. 
Hence, for example, argument would center on how the firm should achieve market 
share expansion, product differentiation and market diversification. In addition, these 
arguments would likely take account of actions from competitors as well purchasing 
trends in the market place. 
3.4 Impact of Manufacturing Firms, Dominant Logic on Knowledge Creation 
Having described the nature of the dominant logic in Hong Kong firms, the two 
remaining questions can now be addressed: 
What kind of new knowledge is allowed to be appropriated as organizational 
knowledge by the dominant logic of the manufacturing firms ？ 
As mentioned above, the pre-occupation with finding buyers has resulted in 
marketing-led strategies. The problem with this is that markets, by their nature, are 
only capable of transmitting codifiable information and hence explicit knowledge. It 
is unable to deal with tacit knowledge. 
The focus on marketing is exacerbated by the family structure of theses businesses. 
As mentioned earlier, the family structure and its emphasis of trust. Family members 
are unwilling to form and express their own tacit knowledge given that their ideas 
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risked being judged as not conforming to the established understanding or ways of 
doing business. On the other hand, incremental ideas are more readily available from 
external sources and they are more comfortable quoting these explicit knowledge. 
Hence, we can see that the manufacturing firms have a tendency to allow only new 
explicit knowledge to be appropriated as organizational knowledge. Tacit knowledge 
appears to be generally not offered to or shared with other members within these 
organizations, based on the ideological values. In other words, the dominant logic of 
these firms appears to focus almost exclusively on explicit knowledge whilst 
hampering the acquisition of tacit knowledge. 
How would the knowledge appropriated and as well as those rejected consequently 
affect the knoM'ledge creation ability of the manufacturing firms? 
The theory of knowledge creation claims that: 
• The organization cannot create knowledge on its own without the initiative of 
the individual and the interaction that takes place within the group. 
• The sharing of tacit knowledge among multiple individuals with different 
backgrounds, perspectives, and motivations becomes the critical step for 
organizational knowledge creation to take place. 
• Organizational knowledge creation is a continuous and dynamic interaction 
between tacit and explicit knowledge 
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Given the propensity of the manufacturing firm to be able to appropriate only explicit 
knowledge to the detriment of tacit knowledge, the theory of knowledge creation 
would suggest that it would be problematic for organizational knowledge creation, 
and hence innovation, to take place in these firms. It also appears that firms that face 
this problem would have to seek alternative routes for their continued survival. 
As noted earlier, the majority of the firms in manufacturing industry have indeed 
taken the path of restructuring by relocation instead of upgrading. In other words, 
they have sought a strategy of competing on cost instead of innovation. 
Hence the facts from the manufacturing industry presented so far appear to provide 
support to the theoretical framework being tested in this study. 
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4. Discussion and Limitations 
In this section, the implications of the findings from the study, as well as limitations 
of the study itself are discussed. 
4.1 Discussion of the Findings 
This study is an initial attempt to better understand the ability of Hong Kong 
organizations at knowledge creation, an area of study which is still relatively new 
which suggests that there may still be room for theorizing and refinement. 
Nevertheless, in this preliminary study the findings based on the theoretical 
framework of dominant logic fused to the theory of knowledge creation, appear to be 
consistent with the historical facts of the industry. This suggests that the framework 
has predictive value, that is, the framework can be used to analyze the dominant logic 
of the firms in general in order to determine: what kind of new knowledge are more 
likely to be appropriated as knowledge for their knowledge and in what manner their 
ability for knowledge creation is hampered. 
In addition, the historical study indicate that the dominant logic that prevailed for at 
least the majority of Hong Kong's manufacturing firms had hampered the 
appropriation of tacit knowledge, that hampered its ability to create new knowledge. 
This provides a further explanation to all the existing studies of why these firms had 
to undergo manufacturing by relocation without upgrading, in contrast with the 
manufacturing firms in the other NIEs. Further studies on the manufacturing firms 
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that did not follow the majority would provide useful contrast and would also help 
strengthen the predictive ability of the theoretical framework. 
It remains to be seen whether with respect to the manufacturing industry the dominant 
logic of the Hong Kong firms has changed especially in light of recent changes in the 
business environment, and more importantly whether the current dominant logic is 
more conducive for appropriating tacit knowledge. 
As noted at the beginning, Hong Kong is shifting to become a knowledge-based 
economy. It appears that the Hong Kong family business ideological values create 
constraints to the willingness of its members to form and express their own tacit 
knowledge. This can prove problematic to the move to a knowledge-based economy 
where generation and sharing of tacit knowledge is a fundamental capability. This 
would be of concern to policy makers especially whether the policies can have a 
positive impact on these ideological values. It would appear appropriate for further 
studies to focus on the service businesses, since these are contributing greater portions 
to the Hong Kong's GDP and thus suggesting that the success of these organizations 
is crucial to the overall economy. It would be important therefore to find out the 
dominant logic of these organizations and their conduciveness for appropriating and 
sharing tacit knowledge and to create organizational knowledge. It can help to find 
out the likelihood of success of these companies in creating a knowledge-based 
economy. 
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4.2 Limitations of the Study 
This study uses secondary analysis derived from other researchers in reviewing for the 
historical dominant logic of the manufacturing firms. It may be better to use original 
data /information e.g. through the use of company archives or interview, although 
these too can be difficult owing to a lack of records kept or inaccurate re-collection, or 
in some cases interview for historical data is no longer possible. Nevertheless, in 




The study of organizational knowledge learning and knowledge offers potentially 
useful insights on the ability of companies to create and utilize organizational 
knowledge to compete effectively in a knowledge-based economy. 
Based on a fusion of the framework proposed by Von Krogh and Grand (2000) and 
Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995), it may be possible to understand the impact of the 
dominant logic of the firm on the organizational knowledge acquisition and 
consequently on its knowledge creation ability. 
This study has attempted to test this framework by looking at Hong Kong's 
manufacturing industry, which followed a different path of restructuring by 
relocation, instead of upgrading as followed by other NIEs. The findings from this 
study suggests that the framework may be able to provide a further explanation for 
this path taken: the dominant logic that prevailed in the industry focused on the 
acquisition of explicit knowledge, whilst tacit knowledge appears to have been 
hampered in some ways, and resulting in a lack of capability for knowledge creation. 
In turn, this deficiency appears to have forced the firms to take to the alternative 
strategy of relocating to a lower cost base. 
Finally, the findings suggest that the framework has some predictive ability on the 
likelihood of companies to be successful in a knowledge-based economy, although 
further studies — such as a study of firms who did not follow the relocation strategy -
may help to strengthen it. 
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Notes 
(1) The term "Organizational Learning and Knowledge" follows that of a recent 
compendium, which consolidates the work to date in the said area (Dierkes 
Antal，Child, and Nonaka, 2001). The handbook provides a comprehensive 
overview of the concept of Organizational Learning and related issues of 
knowledge in organizations. It explains its origins, current applications, and 
where it may be going. It provides a full account of varied disciplinary 
approaches, and discusses major issues in the field. 
(2) This section quotes extensively from various works such as Tsui-Auch (1999) 
McEwen (1994)，Hobday (1995) and other historical accounts of Hong Kong 
by anonymous contributors. 
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